The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
In the college admission problem, we show that the student-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for students if colleges' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand. We also show that both of these properties are important for the result.
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- Ruth Martínez & Jordi Massó & Alejdanro Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2004.
"On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model,"
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- Ruth Mart?ez & Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: firstname.lastname@example.org & Alejandro Neme & Jorge Oviedo, 2003. "On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 577.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, 2005. "College admissions with affirmative action," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(4), pages 535-549, November.
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- SÃ¶nmez, Tayfun & Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005.
"The Boston Public School Match,"
2562764, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2005.
"Course Bidding at Business Schools,"
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618, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Paul Milgrom, 2003.
"Matching with Contracts,"
03003, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
- Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
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