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Dating Preferences and Meeting Opportunities in Mate Choice Decisions

Listed author(s):
  • Michèle Belot
  • Marco Francesconi

Much empirical evidence shows that female and male partners look alike along a variety of attributes. It is, however, unclear how this positive sorting comes about because marriage is an equilibrium outcome arising from a process that entails searching, meeting, and choosing one another. This study takes advantage of unique data to shed light on the forces driving choices at the earliest stage of a relationship. Both women and men value physical attributes, such as age and weight, and reveal that their dating choices are assortative along several traits. Importantly, meeting opportunities have a substantial role in determining dating proposals.

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File URL: http://jhr.uwpress.org/cgi/reprint/48/2/474
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Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Journal of Human Resources.

Volume (Year): 48 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 474-508

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Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:48:y:2013:ii:1:p:474-508
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://jhr.uwpress.org/

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