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A Partner in Crime: Assortative Matching and Bias in the Crime Market

  • Gavrilova, Evelina

In this paper I analyze partnership formation within the property crime market in the United States. I develop a static matching model, in which a criminal forms a partnership with a counterpart with the same probability of success. Using individual arrest data from the National Incident Based Reporting System, I pinpoint matches where the underlying ability of two partners differ. This difference in ability is correlated to observable characteristics, making the case for discrimination. By comparing the regression results to success means for the same demographic groups, I find patterns consistent with discrimination. Beside the patterns of gender and racial segregation, I find that in white-black matches, blacks outperform whites, consistent with success means. In male-female matches the female's success realization is higher than the male's, contrary to the difference in success means, where males on average outperform females, hinting at a distaste premium.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 50432.

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Date of creation: 01 Oct 2013
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:50432
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  1. Robert A. Nakosteen & Olle Westerlund & Michael A. Zimmer, 2004. "Marital Matching and Earnings: Evidence from the Unmarried Population in Sweden," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 39(4).
  2. Gordon Dahl & Stefano DellaVigna, 2007. "Does Movie Violence Increase Violent Crime?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001778, David K. Levine.
  3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Banerjee, Abhijit & Duflo, Esther & Ghatak, Maitreesh & Lafortune, Jeanne, 2009. "Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India," CEPR Discussion Papers 7300, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Ran Abramitzky & Adeline Delavande & Luis Vasconcelos, 2008. "Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching," Discussion Papers 07-050, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  6. Arcand, Jean-Louis & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2012. "Matching in community-based organizations," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 203-219.
  7. Kevin Lang & Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann, 2011. "Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market: Theory and Empirics," NBER Working Papers 17450, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Alarid, Leanne Fiftal & Burton Jr., Velmer S. & Hochstetler, Andy L., 2009. "Group and solo robberies: Do accomplices shape criminal form?," Journal of Criminal Justice, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-9, January.
  9. Cristian Bartolucci, 2009. "Gender Wage Gaps Reconsidered: A Structural Approach Using Matched Employer-Employee Data," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 116, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2010.
  10. Luca Flabbi, 2010. "Gender Discrimination Estimation In A Search Model With Matching And Bargaining," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(3), pages 745-783, 08.
  11. Christian Bredemeier & Falko Juessen, 2013. "Assortative Mating and Female Labor Supply," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(3), pages 603 - 631.
  12. Lones Smith, 2006. "The Marriage Model with Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1124-1146, December.
  13. Bagues, Manuel & Perez-Villadoniga, Maria J., 2012. "Do recruiters prefer applicants with similar skills? Evidence from a randomized natural experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 12-20.
  14. Gunter J. Hitsch & Ali Horta�su & Dan Ariely, 2010. "Matching and Sorting in Online Dating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 130-63, March.
  15. Levitt, Steven D. & Miles, Thomas J., 2007. "Empirical Study of Criminal Punishment," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
  16. Lones Smith, 2011. "Frictional Matching Models," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 319-338, 09.
  17. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
  18. Pencavel, John, 1998. "Assortative Mating by Schooling and the Work Behavior of Wives and Husbands," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 326-29, May.
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