Do recruiters prefer applicants with similar skills? Evidence from a randomized natural experiment
In this paper we explore whether recruiters prefer applicants who are relatively strong in the skills in which the recruiters themselves excel. We analyze evidence from all entry exams to the Spanish Judiciary held between 2003 and 2007, where applicants are randomly assigned across evaluation committees. We find that applicants who excel in the same dimensions as recruiters are significantly more likely to be hired. Our findings have important strategic implications for both public and private sector recruitment practices.
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