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Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show

Author

Listed:
  • Uyanga Turmunkh

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - ULCO - Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Martijn van den Assem
  • Dennie van Dolder

    (UON - University of Nottingham, UK)

Abstract

We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner's Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary approach of classifying statements as promises or not, and propose a more fine-grained two-by-two typology inspired by the idea that lying aversion leads defectors to prefer statements that are malleable to ex-post interpretation as truths. Our empirical analysis shows that statements that carry an element of conditionality or implicitness are associated with a lower likelihood of cooperation, and confirms that malleability is a good criterion for judging the credibility of cheap talk.

Suggested Citation

  • Uyanga Turmunkh & Martijn van den Assem & Dennie van Dolder, 2019. "Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show," Post-Print hal-02110662, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02110662
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159
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    Cited by:

    1. Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2023. "The Way People Lie in Markets: Detectable vs. Deniable Lies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3340-3357, June.
    2. Adam Zylbersztejn & Zakaria Babutsidze & Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2021. "Predicting Trustworthiness Across Cultures: An Experiment," Post-Print hal-03432600, HAL.
    3. Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "The Way People Lie in Markets," Working Papers halshs-02292040, HAL.
    4. Jetter, Michael, 2024. "On the Post-Enlightenment Evolution of Moral Universalism," IZA Discussion Papers 16947, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Barber, Luke & Jetter, Michael & Krieger, Tim, 2024. "Foreshadowing Mars: Religiosity and pre-Enlightenment conflict in Europe," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302355, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. von Schenk, Alicia & Klockmann, Victor & Bonnefon, Jean-François & Rahwan, Iyad & Köbis, Nils, 2023. "Lie-detection algorithms attract few users but vastly increase accusation rates," IAST Working Papers 23-155, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    7. Barber, Luke & Jetter, Michael & Krieger, Tim, 2023. "Foreshadowing Mars: Religiosity and Pre-enlightenment Warfare," IZA Discussion Papers 16586, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Buser, Thomas & van den Assem, Martijn J. & van Dolder, Dennie, 2023. "Gender and willingness to compete for high stakes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 206(C), pages 350-370.
    9. Brams, Steven J. & Mor, Ben D., 2019. "How Lies Induced Cooperation in "Golden Balls:" A Game-Theoretic Analysis," MPRA Paper 97604, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Xiangdong Qin & Siyu Wang & Mike Zhiren Wu, 2024. "Is it what you say or how you say it?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(4), pages 874-921, September.
    11. Zakaria Babutsidze & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2021. "Nonverbal content and trust: An experiment on digital communication," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1517-1532, October.
    12. Michalis Drouvelis & Jennifer Gerson & Nattavudh Powdthavee & Yohanes E Riyanto, 2023. "Large losses from little lies: Strategic gender misrepresentation and cooperation," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(3), pages 1-22, March.
    13. Cristina Bicchieri & Eugen Dimant, 2018. "It's Not A Lie If You Believe It. Lying and Belief Distortion Under Norm-Uncertainty," PPE Working Papers 0012, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    14. Sun, Keh-Kuan & Papadokonstantaki, Stella, 2023. "Lying aversion and vague communication: An experimental study," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    15. Despoina Alempaki & Valeria Burdea & Daniel Read, 2021. "Deceptive Communication: Direct Lies vs. Ignorance, Partial-Truth and Silence," CESifo Working Paper Series 9286, CESifo.
    16. Mujcic, Redzo & Powdthavee, Nattavudh, 2022. "How Do Humans Respond to Huge Financial Losses?," IZA Discussion Papers 15536, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Renaud Foucart & Jonathan H.W. Tan, 2019. "Loyalty Without Trust," Economic Growth Centre Working Paper Series 1903, Nanyang Technological University, School of Social Sciences, Economic Growth Centre.
    18. Alicia von Schenk & Victor Klockmann & Jean-Franc{c}ois Bonnefon & Iyad Rahwan & Nils Kobis, 2022. "Lie detection algorithms attract few users but vastly increase accusation rates," Papers 2212.04277, arXiv.org.
    19. Martin Brown & Jan Schmitz & Christian Zehnder, 2018. "Communication, Credit Provision and Loan Repayment: Evidence from a Person-to-Person Lending Experiment," Working Papers on Finance 1819, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Aug 2020.
    20. Francesco Bogliacino & Paolo Buonanno & Francesco Fallucchi & Marcello Puca, 2023. "Trust in times of AI," CSEF Working Papers 689, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

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