IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v159y2019icp598-612.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A partner in crime: Assortative matching and bias in the crime market

Author

Listed:
  • Gavrilova, Evelina

Abstract

In the market for criminals the Prisoner's Dilemma creates an incentive for every criminal to find a partner with a higher likelihood of success in evading arrest. If no one is arrested, no one will have to talk to the police about the partnership and be at fault for the arrest of the other partner. This incentive leads to an equilibrium pattern of Positive Assortative Matching (PAM) on the likelihood of success. Using individual matched report-arrest data from the National Incident Based Reporting System and a novel empirical strategy, I find that offenders generally match according to PAM on the probability of success. I find that matching between criminals of different race can be subject to search frictions such as availability of potential partners. Matching between genders is likely biased, as females have a higher probability of success than males, contrary to unconditional success ranking. This bias persists in groups of three but diminishes in matches between older criminals, consistent with notions of discrimination. The results are of interest to policy makers who want to impede criminals from organizing.

Suggested Citation

  • Gavrilova, Evelina, 2019. "A partner in crime: Assortative matching and bias in the crime market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 598-612.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:159:y:2019:i:c:p:598-612
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.025
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268117303359
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Ran Abramitzky & Adeline Delavande & Luis Vasconcelos, 2011. "Marrying Up: The Role of Sex Ratio in Assortative Matching," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 124-157, July.
    3. Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, 2006. "Generalising the Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement, With an Application to Vehicle Searches in Wichita," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(515), pages 351-367, November.
    4. Josh Angrist, 2002. "How Do Sex Ratios Affect Marriage and Labor Markets? Evidence from America's Second Generation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(3), pages 997-1038.
    5. Alarid, Leanne Fiftal & Burton Jr., Velmer S. & Hochstetler, Andy L., 2009. "Group and solo robberies: Do accomplices shape criminal form?," Journal of Criminal Justice, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-9, January.
    6. Levitt, Steven D. & Miles, Thomas J., 2007. "Empirical Study of Criminal Punishment," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier.
    7. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    8. Raymond Fisman & Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica & Itamar Simonson, 2006. "Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence From a Speed Dating Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(2), pages 673-697.
    9. Pencavel, John, 1998. "Assortative Mating by Schooling and the Work Behavior of Wives and Husbands," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 326-329, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Organized crime; Assortative matching; Discrimination;

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:159:y:2019:i:c:p:598-612. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.