On the Segmentation of Markets
This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is nontransferable. There exist infinitely many marketplaces, and each agent chooses which marketplace to be in: agents get to choose not only whom to match with but also whom they meet with. Perfect segmentation is obtained in equilibrium, where agents match with the first person they meet. All equilibria have the same matching pattern. Although perfect assortative matching is not obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is greater than in standard models. (c) 2007 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pieter A. Gautier, 2001.
"The Right Man for the Job,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
540, CESifo Group Munich.
- Coen N. Teulings & Pieter A. Gautier, 2004. "The Right Man for the Job," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 553-580.
- Coen N. Teulings & Pieter A. Gautier, 2004. "The Right Man for the Job," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 553-580, 04.
- Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao, 2005.
"Price Discrimination and Efficient Matching,"
Microeconomics.ca working papers
damiano-05-03-21-12-21-58, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 22 Mar 2005.
- Dale T. Mortensen & Randall Wright, 2002. "Competitive Pricing and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-20, February.
- Gautam Bose, 2003. "Endogenous market segmentation with heterogeneous agents," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 457-467, 09.
- Davidson, Carl & Martin, Lawrence & Matusz, Steven, 1988. "The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models with Frictional Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(6), pages 1267-93, December.
- Kevin Lang & Michael Manove & William T. Dickens, 2005.
"Racial Discrimination in Labor Markets with Posted Wage Offers,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series
dp-145, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Kevin Lang & Michael Manove & William T. Dickens, 2005. "Racial Discrimination in Labor Markets with Posted Wage Offers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1327-1340, September.
- Eeckhout, Jan, 1999. "Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 869-87, November.
- Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "Factor Market Search and the Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 325-55, April.
- Uren Lawrence, 2006. "The Allocation of Labor and Endogenous Search Decisions," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-31, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed005:456. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.