IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/restud/v73y2006i1p31-53.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Minorities and Endogenous Segregation

Author

Listed:
  • Jan Eeckhout

Abstract

A theoretical analysis is proposed of segregation as an equilibrium phenomenon in a random-matching model of the marriage market. Otherwise identical partners possess a pay-off-irrelevant characteristic, colour. We derive the set of colour-blind equilibria and show that they are generically constrained inefficient. Equilibrium segregation strategies are strategies that condition actions on the type of match. It is shown that distributions of types exist such that segregation equilibrium pay-offs Pareto dominate colour-blind pay-offs. For other distributions, segregation also generates conflict, where the majority unambiguously gains, while the minority group may lose. Giving preferential treatment, that is, minority bias, can increase overall welfare. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Eeckhout, 2006. "Minorities and Endogenous Segregation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 31-53.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:1:p:31-53
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00368.x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rafael Rob & Huanxing Yang, 2010. "Long-term relationships as safeguards," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(2), pages 143-166, May.
    2. Hanjoon Michael Jung, 2012. "Ability-based Cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 28, pages 137-160.
    3. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Nobue Suzuki, 2015. "Efficiency may improve when defectors exist," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 423-460, November.
    4. Filip Vesely & Chun-Lei Yang, 2013. "On Optimal Social Convention in Voluntary Continuation Prisoner's Dilemma Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 4553, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Choy, James, 2013. "A Theory of Cooperation through Social Division, with Evidence from Nepal," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 115, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    6. Harbaugh, Rick & To, Ted, 2014. "Opportunistic discrimination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 192-204.
    7. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009. "Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(3), pages 993-1021.
    8. Coles, Melvyn & Francesconi, Marco, 2007. "On the Emergence of Toyboys: Equilibrium Matching with Ageing and Uncertain Careers," IZA Discussion Papers 2612, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2015. "Segregation in Education and Labour Market Discrimination: The Role of Peer Beliefs," CEPR Discussion Papers 10394, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. David McAdams, 2011. "Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 107-142, November.
    11. Michèle Belot & Marco Francesconi, 2013. "Dating Preferences and Meeting Opportunities in Mate Choice Decisions," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 48(2), pages 474-508.
    12. Balazs Szentes & Marcin Pęski, 2012. "Spontaneous Discrimination," Working Papers 2012-005, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    13. Gautier, Pieter A. & Svarer, Michael & Teulings, Coen N., 2010. "Marriage and the city: Search frictions and sorting of singles," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 206-218, March.
    14. Anderson, Axel, 2015. "A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 290-310.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:73:y:2006:i:1:p:31-53. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.