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Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simultaneous Games with Incomplete Information, Second Version

Author

Listed:
  • Aureo de Paula

    () (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Xun Tang

    () (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

This paper studies the inference of interaction effects (impacts of players' actions on each other's payoffs) in discrete simultaneous games with incomplete information. We propose an easily implementable test for the signs of state-dependent interaction effects that does not require parametric specifications of players' payoffs, the distributions of their private signals or the equilibrium selection mechanism. The test relies on the commonly invoked assumption that players' private signals are independent conditional on observed states. The procedure is valid in (but does not rely on) the presence of multiple equilibria in the data-generating process (DGP). As a by-product, we propose a formal test for multiple equilibria in the DGP. We also show how to extend our arguments to identify signs of interaction effects when private signals are correlated. We provide Monte Carlo evidence of the test's good performance in finite samples. We then implement the test using data on radio programming of commercial breaks in the U.S., and infer stations' incentives to synchronize their commercial breaks. Our results support the earlier finding by Sweeting (2009) that stations have stronger incentives.

Suggested Citation

  • Aureo de Paula & Xun Tang, 2010. "Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simultaneous Games with Incomplete Information, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 12 Feb 2011.
  • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:11-003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aradillas-Lopez, Andres, 2010. "Semiparametric estimation of a simultaneous game with incomplete information," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 157(2), pages 409-431, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nianqing Liu & Haiqing Xu, "undated". "Semiparametric Analysis of Binary Games of Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 130911, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2012.
    2. Michèle Belot & Marco Francesconi, 2013. "Dating Preferences and Meeting Opportunities in Mate Choice Decisions," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 48(2), pages 474-508.
    3. Taisuke Otsu & Martin Pesendorfer & Yuya Takahashi, 2016. "Pooling data across markets in dynamic Markov games," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), pages 523-559, July.
    4. Otsu, Taisuke & Pesendorfer, Martin & Takahashi, Yuya, 2014. "Testing Equilibrium Multiplicity in Dynamic Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 10111, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    identification; inference; multiple equilibria; incomplete information games;

    JEL classification:

    • C01 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Econometrics
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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