Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simultaneous Games with Incomplete Information
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Other versions of this item:
- Áureo de Paula & Xun Tang, 2012. "Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simultaneous Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 143-172, January.
- Aureo de Paula & Xun Tang, 2010. "Inference of Signs of Interaction Effects in Simultaneous Games with Incomplete Information," PIER Working Paper Archive 10-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
References listed on IDEAS
- Charles F. Manski, 1993.
"Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 531-542.
- Manski, C.F., 1991. "Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: the Reflection Problem," Working papers 9127, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Aradillas-Lopez, Andres, 2010. "Semiparametric estimation of a simultaneous game with incomplete information," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 157(2), pages 409-431, August.
More about this item
- C01 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Econometrics
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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