The strategic timing incentives of commercial radio stations: An empirical analysis using multiple equilibria
Commercial radio stations and advertisers may have conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This article estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available. It finds that stations want to play their commercials at the same time, suggesting that stations' incentives are at least partially aligned with the interests of advertisers, although equilibrium coordination is far from perfect. Coordination incentives are much stronger during drivetime hours, when more listeners switch stations, and in smaller markets. Copyright (c) 2009, RAND.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 40 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0741-6261
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0741-6261|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ellickson, Paul & Misra, Sanjog, 2006.
"Supermarket Pricing Strategies,"
06-02, Duke University, Department of Economics.
- Martin Pesendorfer & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, 2008. "Asymptotic Least Squares Estimators for Dynamic Games -super-1," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 901-928.
- Bresnahan, T.F & Reiss, P.C., 1989.
"Entry And Competition In Concentrated Markets,"
151, Stanford - Studies in Industry Economics.
- Daniel A. Ackerberg & Gautam Gowrisankaran, 2006.
"Quantifying equilibrium network externalities in the ACH banking industry,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 738-761, 09.
- Gautam Gowrisankaran & Daniel A. Ackerberg, 2003. "Quantifying Equilibrium Network Externalities in the ACH Banking Industry," Working Papers 03-06, NET Institute, revised Sep 2003.
- Daniel A. Ackerberg & Gautam Gowrisankaran, 2006. "Quantifying Equilibrium Network Externalities in the ACH Banking Industry," NBER Working Papers 12488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Federico Ciliberto & Elie Tamer, 2009.
"Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets,"
Econometric Society, vol. 77(6), pages 1791-1828, November.
- Elie Tamer & Federico Ciliberto, 2004. "Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 517, Econometric Society.
- Elie Tamer & Federico Ciliberto, 2004. "Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets," 2004 Meeting Papers 52, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Ciliberto, Federico & Tamer, Elie, 2009. "Market structure and multiple equilibria in airline markets," MPRA Paper 38635, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hanfeng Chen & Jiahua Chen & John D. Kalbfleisch, 2004. "Testing for a finite mixture model with two components," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 66(1), pages 95-115.
- Patrick Bajari & Han Hong & Stephen Ryan, 2004.
"Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information,"
NBER Technical Working Papers
0301, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stephen Ryan & Patrick Bajari & Han Hong, 2005. "Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 53, Society for Computational Economics.
- Andrew Sweeting, 2006. "Coordination, Differentiation, and the Timing of Radio Commercials," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 909-942, December.
- Victor Aguirregabiria & Pedro Mira, 2007.
"Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 1-53, 01.
- Hanfeng Chen & Jiahua Chen & John D. Kalbfleisch, 2001. "A modified likelihood ratio test for homogeneity in finite mixture models," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 63(1), pages 19-29.
- Ariel Pakes & J. Porter & Kate Ho & Joy Ishii, 2007. "Moment inequalities and their application," CeMMAP working papers CWP16/07, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Rysman, Marc & Greenstein, Shane, 2005. "Testing for agglomeration and dispersion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 405-411, March.
- Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Reiss, Peter C., 1991. "Empirical models of discrete games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1-2), pages 57-81.
- Hotz, V Joseph & Miller, Robert A, 1993.
"Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation of Dynamic Models,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 497-529, July.
- V. Joseph Hotz & Robert A. Miller, 1992. "Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation of Dynamic Models," Working Papers 9202, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
- Hotz, V.J. & Miller, R.A., 1991. "Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation of Dynamic Models," GSIA Working Papers 1992-12, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Bajari, Patrick & Hong, Han & Krainer, John & Nekipelov, Denis, 2010.
"Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interactions,"
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics,
American Statistical Association, vol. 28(4), pages 469-482.
- Rust, John, 1987. "Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 999-1033, September.
- Elie Tamer, 2003. "Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 147-165, January.
- Angelique Augereau & Shane Greenstein & Marc Rysman, 2006. "Coordination versus differentiation in a standards war: 56K modems," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 887-909, December.
- repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:619-640 is not listed on IDEAS
- Elie Tamer, 2003. "Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 147-165.
- repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:738-761 is not listed on IDEAS
- Gil S. Epstein, 1998. "Network Competition and the Timing of Commercials," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(3), pages 370-387, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:4:p:710-742. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.