IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/randje/v40y2009i4p710-742.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The strategic timing incentives of commercial radio stations: An empirical analysis using multiple equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew Sweeting

Abstract

Commercial radio stations and advertisers may have conflicting interests about when commercial breaks should be played. This article estimates an incomplete information timing game to examine stations' equilibrium timing incentives. It shows how identification can be aided by the existence of multiple equilibria when appropriate data are available. It finds that stations want to play their commercials at the same time, suggesting that stations' incentives are at least partially aligned with the interests of advertisers, although equilibrium coordination is far from perfect. Coordination incentives are much stronger during drivetime hours, when more listeners switch stations, and in smaller markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Sweeting, 2009. "The strategic timing incentives of commercial radio stations: An empirical analysis using multiple equilibria," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(4), pages 710-742, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:4:p:710-742
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00086.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00086.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00086.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. A. Pakes & J. Porter & Kate Ho & Joy Ishii, 2015. "Moment Inequalities and Their Application," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 315-334, January.
    2. Rust, John, 1987. "Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 999-1033, September.
    3. V. Joseph Hotz & Robert A. Miller, 1993. "Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation of Dynamic Models," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 497-529.
    4. Rysman, Marc & Greenstein, Shane, 2005. "Testing for agglomeration and dispersion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 405-411, March.
    5. Patrick Bajari & Han Hong & Stephen P. Ryan, 2010. "Identification and Estimation of a Discrete Game of Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1529-1568, September.
    6. Hanfeng Chen & Jiahua Chen & John D. Kalbfleisch, 2004. "Testing for a finite mixture model with two components," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 66(1), pages 95-115, February.
    7. Bajari, Patrick & Hong, Han & Krainer, John & Nekipelov, Denis, 2010. "Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interactions," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 28(4), pages 469-482.
    8. Federico Ciliberto & Elie Tamer, 2009. "Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(6), pages 1791-1828, November.
    9. Gil S. Epstein, 1998. "Network Competition and the Timing of Commercials," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(3), pages 370-387, March.
    10. Victor Aguirregabiria & Pedro Mira, 2007. "Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 1-53, January.
    11. Paul B. Ellickson & Sanjog Misra, 2008. "Supermarket Pricing Strategies," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(5), pages 811-828, 09-10.
    12. Angelique Augereau & Shane Greenstein & Marc Rysman, 2006. "Coordination versus differentiation in a standards war: 56K modems," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 887-909, December.
    13. Brock,W.A. & Durlauf,S.N., 2003. "Multinomial choice with social interactions," Working papers 1, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    14. repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:619-640 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:738-761 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Martin Pesendorfer & Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, 2008. "Asymptotic Least Squares Estimators for Dynamic Games -super-1," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 901-928.
    17. Bresnahan, Timothy F & Reiss, Peter C, 1991. "Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 977-1009, October.
    18. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Gautam Gowrisankaran, 2006. "Quantifying equilibrium network externalities in the ACH banking industry," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 738-761, September.
    19. Katja Seim, 2006. "An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product‐type choices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 619-640, September.
    20. Hanfeng Chen & Jiahua Chen & John D. Kalbfleisch, 2001. "A modified likelihood ratio test for homogeneity in finite mixture models," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series B, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 63(1), pages 19-29.
    21. Elie Tamer, 2003. "Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 147-165.
    22. Andrew Sweeting, 2006. "Coordination, Differentiation, and the Timing of Radio Commercials," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 909-942, December.
    23. Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Reiss, Peter C., 1991. "Empirical models of discrete games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1-2), pages 57-81.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Paul B. Ellickson & Sanjog Misra, 2011. "Structural Workshop Paper --Estimating Discrete Games," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(6), pages 997-1010, November.
    2. Aradillas-Lopez, Andres, 2012. "Pairwise-difference estimation of incomplete information games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 120-140.
    3. Xiao, Ruli, 2018. "Identification and estimation of incomplete information games with multiple equilibria," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 203(2), pages 328-343.
    4. Ruli Xiao, 2015. "Identification and Estimation of Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Equilibria," CAEPR Working Papers 2015-007, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    5. Paul L. E. Grieco, 2014. "Discrete games with flexible information structures: an application to local grocery markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(2), pages 303-340, June.
    6. Luo, Yao & Xiao, Ping & Xiao, Ruli, 2022. "Identification of dynamic games with unobserved heterogeneity and multiple equilibria," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 226(2), pages 343-367.
    7. Paul Ellickson & Sanjog Misra, 2012. "Enriching interactions: Incorporating outcome data into static discrete games," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-26, March.
    8. A. Ronald Gallant & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2018. "The Dynamic Spillovers of Entry: An Application to the Generic Drug Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(3), pages 1189-1211, March.
    9. Jason R. Blevins & Ahmed Khwaja & Nathan Yang, 2018. "Firm Expansion, Size Spillovers, and Market Dominance in Retail Chain Dynamics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(9), pages 4070-4093.
    10. Che-Lin Su, 2014. "Estimating discrete-choice games of incomplete information: Simple static examples," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 167-207, June.
    11. Andrew Sweeting, 2005. "Coordination Games, Multiple Equilibria and the Timing of Radio Commercials," 2005 Meeting Papers 490, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Sanjog Misra, 2013. "Markov chain Monte Carlo for incomplete information discrete games," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 117-153, March.
    13. Wang, Yafeng & Graham, Brett, 2010. "Identification and Estimation of a Discrete Game by Observing its Correlated Equilibria," MPRA Paper 45656, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 May 2011.
    14. Victor Aguirregabiria & Margaret Slade, 2017. "Empirical models of firms and industries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1445-1488, December.
    15. Victor Aguirregabiria & Arvind Magesan, 2020. "Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games When Players’ Beliefs Are Not in Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 582-625.
    16. Wang, Jin, 2021. "Do birds of a feather flock together? Platform’s quality screening and end-users’ choices theory and empirical study of online trading platforms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    17. Marcoux, Mathieu, 2022. "Strategic interactions in mobile network investment with a new entrant and unobserved heterogeneity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    18. Michaela Draganska & Sanjog Misra & Victor Aguirregabiria & Pat Bajari & Liran Einav & Paul Ellickson & Dan Horsky & Sridhar Narayanan & Yesim Orhun & Peter Reiss & Katja Seim & Vishal Singh & Raphael, 2008. "Discrete choice models of firms’ strategic decisions," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 399-416, December.
    19. Li, Shanjun & Liu, Yanyan & Deininger, Klaus W., 2009. "How Important are Peer Effects in Group Lending? Estimating a Static Game of Incomplete Information," 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 49497, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    20. Jun, Sung Jae & Pinkse, Joris, 2020. "Counterfactual prediction in complete information games: Point prediction under partial identification," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 216(2), pages 394-429.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:40:y:2009:i:4:p:710-742. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/randdus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/randdus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.