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The Effect of Time in a Multi-Dimensional Marriage Market Model

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  • Mario Vozar

Abstract

In the paper, I develop a theoretical model of a marriage market that accounts for the effect of aging on agents’ wealth and physical attractiveness. Furthermore, I use the model to analyze how the structure and more importantly the stability of the marriage market is affected by the increased female income prospects. First, I find that the changes in agents’ characteristics can result in an incentive to re-match and thus provide yet another explanation of the phenomenon of divorce. Second, comparative statics show that an increase in female income prospects increases the divorce rate, which suggests that the stabilization effect of being more attractive for a current partner is dominated by the effect of increased female marriage market opportunities.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Vozar, 2010. "The Effect of Time in a Multi-Dimensional Marriage Market Model," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp417, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  • Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp417
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    7. Gunter J. Hitsch & Ali Hortaçsu & Dan Ariely, 2010. "Matching and Sorting in Online Dating," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 130-163, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    aging; divorce; two-sided matching; Gale-Shapley marriage problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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