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Gender Discrimination and Common Property Resources

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  • Casari, Marco

    () (University of Bologna)

  • Lisciandra, Maurizio

    () (University of Messina)

Abstract

In an open economy with common property resources at the community level, marriage and migratory decisions crucially depend on inheritance rules on the commons. Motivated by the traditional management of the commons in the Italian Alps, we present a model that fits the evolution of property rights observed over six centuries. Women's rights over the commons were progressively eroded from the Middle Ages until 1800, when there was an almost universal adoption of a patrilineal inheritance system. Communities switched from an egalitarian system to a patrilineal inheritance system in an attempt to protect the per capita endowment of common resources from outside immigration. The model shows that inheritance rules have clear-cut implications for marriage strategies, migratory flows, and fertility rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Casari, Marco & Lisciandra, Maurizio, 2015. "Gender Discrimination and Common Property Resources," IZA Discussion Papers 9601, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9601
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    inheritance; commons; migration; institutions; property rights;

    JEL classification:

    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land

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