The Pre-Marital Investment Game
Two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively. The purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that trader can attain in the second stage. The paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games as the number of traders gets large. It is shown that mixed Nash equilibria in the finite games converge to degenerate pure strategy equilibria in the limit in which both sides of the market invest too much.
|Date of creation:||18 Feb 2004|
|Date of revision:||13 Sep 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/|
References listed on IDEAS
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- Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2002.
"Competing Premarital Investments,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 592-608, June.
- Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2000. "Competing Pre-marital Investments," Working Papers peters-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2001. "Competing Premarital Investment," Working Papers peters-01-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Ed Hopkins, 2006.
"Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence,"
321307000000000553, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ed Hopkins, 2012. "Job Market Signaling Of Relative Position, Or Becker Married To Spence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 290-322, 04.
- Ed Hopkins, 2005. "Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Married to Spence," ESE Discussion Papers 134, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Nosaka, Hiromi, 2007. "Specialization and competition in marriage models," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 104-119, May.
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