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Assortative Matching and the Education Gap

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  • Ximena Peña

Abstract

This paper attempts to explain the decrease and reversal of the education gap between males and females. Given a continuum of agents, the education decisions are modelled as an assignment game with endogenous types. In the first stage agents choose their education level and in the second they participate in the labor and marriage markets. Competition among potential matches ensures that the efficient education levels can always be sustained in equilibrium, but there may be inefficient equilibria. Combining asymmetries intrinsic to the modelled markets the model reproduces the observed education gap.

Suggested Citation

  • Ximena Peña, 2006. "Assortative Matching and the Education Gap," Borradores de Economia 427, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:427
    DOI: 10.32468/be.427
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    1. Cole, Harold L. & Mailath, George J. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2001. "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 333-373, December.
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    3. Alejandro Badel & Ximena Peña, 2010. "Decomposing the Gender Wage Gap with Sample Selection Adjustment: Evidence from Colombia," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business, vol. 25(2), pages 169-191, Diciembre.
    4. Gretsky, Neil E & Ostroy, Joseph M & Zame, William R, 1992. "The Nonatomic Assignment Model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 103-127, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ximena Pena & Raquel Bernal & Diego Amador, 2013. "The rise in female participation in Colombia: Fertility, marital status or education?," Revista ESPE - Ensayos Sobre Política Económica, Banco de la República, vol. 31(71), pages 54-63, June.
    2. Alejandro Badel & Ximena Peña, 2010. "Decomposing the Gender Wage Gap with Sample Selection Adjustment: Evidence from Colombia," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business, vol. 25(2), pages 169-191, Diciembre.
    3. Raquel Bernal & Adriana Camacho & Carmen Elisa Flórez & Alejandro Gaviria, 2009. "Desarrollo económico: retos y políticas públicas," Documentos CEDE 5269, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Assortative matching; efficiency; gender; education.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis

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