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The Marriage Market, Labor Supply and Education Choice

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We develop an equilibrium lifecycle model of education, marriage and labor supply and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their investmentsin education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market. They then match based on the economic value of marriage and on preferences. Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources. Following marriage households (married or single) save, supply labor and consume private and public commodities under uncertainty. Marriage thus has the dual role of providing public goods and offering risk sharing. The model is estimated using the British HPS.

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  • Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Monica Costa Dias & Costas Meghir, 2015. "The Marriage Market, Labor Supply and Education Choice," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1994R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2016.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1994r
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    Cited by:

    1. Adams, Abigail & Andrew, Alison, 2019. "Preferences and Beliefs in the Marriage Market for Young Brides," CEPR Discussion Papers 13567, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Wei-Bin Zhang, 2020. "Cournot-Nash Family Decision and Economic Growth in an Extended Solowian Model," Academicus International Scientific Journal, Entrepreneurship Training Center Albania, issue 21, pages 101-114, January.
    3. Richard Blundell & Monica Costa-Dias & David Goll & Costas Meghir, 2021. "Wages, Experience, and Training of Women over the Life Cycle," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(S1), pages 275-315.
    4. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Monica Costa Dias & Costas Meghir, 2020. "Changes in Assortative Matching: Theory and Evidence for the US," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2226, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Dan Anderberg & Jesper Bagger & V. Bhaskar & Tanya Wilson, 2019. "Marriage market equilibrium, qualifications, and ability," CESifo Working Paper Series 7570, CESifo.
    6. Berliant, Marcus & Thakur, Sounak, 2019. "Commitment and matching in the marriage market," MPRA Paper 96001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Naomi Friedman-Sokuler & Claudia Senik, 2020. "From Pink-Collar to Lab Coat. Cultural Persistence and Diffusion of Socialist Gender Norms," PSE Working Papers halshs-02872229, HAL.
    8. Demuynck, Thomas & Potoms, Tom, 2020. "Weakening transferable utility: The case of non-intersecting Pareto curves," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    9. Safoura Moeeni, 2021. "Married women’s labor force participation and intra-household bargaining power," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 1411-1448, March.
    10. Pierre‐André Chiappori & Monica Costa‐Dias & Sam Crossman & Costas Meghir, 2020. "Changes in Assortative Matching and Inequality in Income: Evidence for the UK," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(1), pages 39-63, March.
    11. Magnac, Thierry & Roux, Sébastien, 2021. "Heterogeneity and wage inequalities over the life cycle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    12. Bratsberg, Bernt & Markussen, Simen & Raaum, Oddbjørn & Røed, Knut & Røgeberg, Ole J., 2018. "Trends in Assortative Mating and Offspring Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 11753, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Shahram Moeeni & Maryam Moeeni, 2021. "The Impact of Intra-household Bargaining Game on Progression to Third Birth in Iran," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 61-72, March.
    14. Abi Adams & Alison Andrew, 2019. "Preferences and beliefs in the marriage market for young brides," IFS Working Papers W19/05, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    15. Maximilian Blesch & Philipp Eisenhauer, 2021. "Robust decision-making under risk and ambiguity," Papers 2104.12573, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
    16. Alberto Bisin & Giulia Tura, 2019. "Marriage, Fertility, and Cultural Integration in Italy," NBER Working Papers 26303, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Lars Kirkebøen & Edwin Leuven & Magne Mogstad, 2021. "College as a Marriage Market," Discussion Papers 950, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    18. Alberto Bisin & Giulia Tura, 2019. "Marriage, Fertility, and Cultural Integration of Immigrants in Italy," Working Papers 2019-063, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    19. Maximilian Blesch & Philipp Eisenhauer, 2021. "Robust Decision-Making Under Risk and Ambiguity," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 104, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    20. Wei-Bin Zhang, 2020. "Gender Power and Family Decision in an Extended Solowian Economic Growth Model," Technium Social Sciences Journal, Technium Science, vol. 5(1), pages 70-83, March.
    21. Kramarz, Francis & Nordström Skans, Oskar & Rosenqvist, Olof, 2019. "Skills, education and fertility -and the confounding impact of family background," Working Paper Series 2019:10, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
    22. Bredemeier, Christian & Gravert, Jan & Juessen, Falko, 2021. "Accounting for Limited Commitment between Spouses When Estimating Labor-Supply Elasticities," IZA Discussion Papers 14226, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    23. You, Jing & Yi, Xuejie & Chen, Meng, 2016. "Love, Life, and “Leftover Ladies” in Urban China," MPRA Paper 70494, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Marriage market; Human capital; Labor supply; Life cycle models; Intrahousehold allocations; Collective model; Education choice; Returns to education;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality
    • I26 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Returns to Education

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