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Negative assortative matching of risk-averse agents with transferable expected utility

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  • Schulhofer-Wohl, Sam

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  • Schulhofer-Wohl, Sam, 2006. "Negative assortative matching of risk-averse agents with transferable expected utility," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 383-388, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:92:y:2006:i:3:p:383-388
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2007. "Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1073-1102, July.
    2. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    3. Maurizio Mazzocco, 2007. "Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and a Test of Commitment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 857-895.
    4. Robert A. Pollak, 1971. "Additive Utility Functions and Linear Engel Curves," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(4), pages 401-414.
    5. Bergstrom, Theodore C. & Varian, Hal R., 1985. "When do market games have transferable utility?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 222-233, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luc Arrondel & Nicolas Frémeaux, 2016. "‘For Richer, For Poorer’: Assortative Mating and Savings Preferences," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(331), pages 518-543, July.
    2. Sperisen, Benjamin & Wiseman, Thomas, 2020. "Too good to fire: Non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 491-511.
    3. Pierre-André Chiappori & Monica Costa Dias & Costas Meghir, 2018. "The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(S1), pages 26-72.
    4. Hector Chade & Jan Eeckhout & Lones Smith, 2017. "Sorting through Search and Matching Models in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 55(2), pages 493-544, June.
    5. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 2021. "Mating Markets," Working Papers 2021-016, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    6. Pierre-André Chiappori & Monica Costa Dias & Costas Meghir, 2015. "The marriage market, labor supply and education choice," CeMMAP working papers 14/15, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    7. Sanxi Li & Hailin Sun & Jianye Yan & Xundong Yin, 2015. "Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 115(3), pages 257-274, July.
    8. Caichun Chai & Eilin Francis & Tiaojun Xiao, 2021. "Supply chain dynamics with assortative matching," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 179-206, January.
    9. Christian Ahlin, 2017. "Matching Patterns When Group Size Exceeds Two," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 352-384, February.
    10. Xiao Yu Wang, 2014. "Risk Sorting, Portfolio Choice, and Endogenous Informal Insurance," NBER Working Papers 20429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Lam, Wing Tung, 2020. "Inefficient sorting under output sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    12. Hailin Sun & Sanxi Li & Tong Wang, 2013. "Assortative Matching and Risk Sharing," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 041, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    13. Hector Chade, 2013. "Stochastic Sorting," 2013 Meeting Papers 1222, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Delpierre, Matthieu & Verheyden, Bertrand & Weynants, Stéphanie, 2016. "Is informal risk-sharing less effective for the poor? Risk externalities and moral hazard in mutual insurance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 282-297.
    15. Nicolas Bonneton & Christopher Sandmann, 2023. "Non-Stationary Search and Assortative Matching," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_465, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    16. Sanxi Li & Hailin Sun & Pu Chen, 2013. "Assortative matching of risk-averse agents with endogenous risk," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 27-40, May.
    17. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Reny, Philip J., 2016. "Matching to share risk," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
    18. Li, Sanxi & Sun, Hailin & Wang, Tong & Yu, Jun, 2016. "Assortative matching and risk sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 248-275.
    19. Pu Chen & Sanxi Li & Bing Ye, 2018. "Risk†Sharing Matching And Moral Hazard," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 165-174, April.
    20. Aristidis K. Nikoloulopoulos & Peter G. Moffatt, 2019. "Coupling Couples With Copulas: Analysis Of Assortative Matching On Risk Attitude," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 654-666, January.

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