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Intrahousehold Decision Making and Fertility

Author

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  • Doepke, Matthias

    (Northwestern University)

  • Kindermann, Fabian

    (University of Bonn)

Abstract

The economic theory of fertility choice builds predominantly on the unitary model of the household, in which there is a single household utility function and potential intra-household disagreement is abstracted from. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that many (potential) mothers and fathers disagree on whether to have children, on how many children to have, and on when to have them. In this paper, we review existing work that brings models of intrahousehold conflict and bargaining to bear on fertility choice, and we point out promising future directions for this line of research.

Suggested Citation

  • Doepke, Matthias & Kindermann, Fabian, 2014. "Intrahousehold Decision Making and Fertility," IZA Discussion Papers 8726, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8726
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Pauline Rossi, 2019. "Strategic Choices in Polygamous Households: Theory and Evidence from Senegal," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(3), pages 1332-1370.
    3. Malginov, Georgiy (Мальгинов, Георгий) & Radygin, Alexander (Радыгин, Александр), 2015. "Property management of the state treasury of the Russian Federation: some of the current trends [Управление Имуществом Государственной Казны Рф: Некоторые Актуальные Тенденции]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 20-46.
    4. CAMILLI, Andrea; LAGERBORG, Andresa, 2017. "Do Labor Market Institutions Matter for Fertility?," Economics Working Papers ECO 2017/07, European University Institute.
    5. Mizuki Komura & Hikaru Ogawa, 2019. "Capital market integration and gender inequality," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 1387-1413, August.
    6. Yoosik Youm & Byungkyu Lee, 2016. "A network approach to economic models of fertility," Rationality and Society, , vol. 28(4), pages 386-409, November.
    7. Kesternich, Iris & Siflinger, Bettina & Smith, James P. & Steckenleiter, Carina, 2020. "Unbalanced sex ratios in Germany caused by World War II and their effect on fertility: A life cycle perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fertility; bargaining; child care; limited commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

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