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Matching Patterns When Group Size Exceeds Two

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  • Christian Ahlin

Abstract

We study one-sided matching when groups with n > 2 members are being formed. Type-complementarity rules out all but the rank-ordered grouping. Type-substitutability (for example, matching to share risk) rules out much less. It requires that every two groups must be "intertwined," in that each dominates the other at some rank. Intertwined matching is necessary and, in one context, sufficient for any grouping to be a potential equilibrium. But there are many intertwined matching patterns when n > 2. Thus, substitutability can be observationally similar to complementarity; we demonstrate this by showing that dyadic regressions can register intertwined (negative assortative) matching as homogeneous matching.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Ahlin, 2017. "Matching Patterns When Group Size Exceeds Two," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 352-384, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:9:y:2017:i:1:p:352-84
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150080
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    6. Christian Ahlin, 2020. "Group lending, matching patterns, and the mystery of microcredit: Evidence from Thailand," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), pages 713-759, May.
    7. Philip Protter & Alejandra Quintos, 2020. "Optimal Group Size in Microlending," Papers 2006.06035, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2020.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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