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Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities

Author

Listed:
  • Patrick Legros

    () (ECARES, Universite Libre de Bruxelles)

  • Andrew F. Newman

    (Department of Economics, University College London)

Abstract

We present sufficient conditions for monotone matching in environments where utility is not fully transferable between partners. These conditions involve complementarity in types not only of the total payoff to a match, as in the transferable utility case, but also in the degree of transferability between partners. We apply our conditions to study some models of risk sharing and incentive problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2003. "Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Economics Working Papers 0030, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0030
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nontransferable Utility; Assignment Games; Sorting;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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