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The Comparative Statics of Sorting

Author

Listed:
  • Axel Anderson
  • Lones Smith

Abstract

We create a general and tractable theory of increasing sorting in pairwise matching models with monetary transfers. The positive quadrant dependence partial order subsumes Becker (1973) as the extreme cases with most and least sorting and implies increasing regression coefficients. Our theory turns on synergy—the cross-partial difference or derivative of match production. This reflects basic economic forces: diminishing returns, technological convexity, insurance, and learning dynamics. We prove sorting increases if match synergy globally increases, and is cross-sectionally monotone or single crossing. We use our results to derive sorting predictions in major economics sorting papers and in new applications.

Suggested Citation

  • Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2024. "The Comparative Statics of Sorting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(3), pages 709-751, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:114:y:2024:i:3:p:709-51
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210890
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    Cited by:

    1. Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay, 2025. "Commonality of information and commonality of beliefs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 20(4), November.
    2. Gola, Paweł, 2025. "The pond dilemma with heterogeneous relative concerns," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 249(C).
    3. Simon Clark, 2025. "Gender Norms in a Simple Model of Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 314, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    4. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2022. "The comparative statics of persuasion," Papers 2204.07474, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
    5. Christopher Sandmann & Nicolas Bonneton, 2023. "Existence of a Non-Stationary Equilibrium in Search-And-Matching Models: TU and NTU," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_427v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, revised Feb 2025.
    6. Nicolas Bonneton & Christopher Sandmann, 2023. "Non-Stationary Search and Assortative Matching," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_465v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, revised Feb 2025.
    7. Jiaxing Weng & Haijun Yang & Tongyu Wang, 2025. "Emergence of Homophily under Contextual Mechanisms," Papers 2510.09821, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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