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Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-sided Matching


  • Simon Clark



This paper analyses a sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility. The condition is easy to interpret, being based on the notion that a person's characteristics both form the basis of their attraction to the opposite sex, and determine their own sexual preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Clark, 2002. "Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-sided Matching," ESE Discussion Papers 84, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  • Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:84

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Clark, Simon & Kanbur, Ravi, 2004. "Stable partnerships, matching, and local public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 905-925, August.
    2. Eeckhout, Jan, 2000. "On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-8, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lars Ehlers & Jordi Massó, 2004. "Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets," Working Papers 147, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    2. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2007. "Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1073-1102, July.
    3. Simon Clark, 2003. "Matching and Sorting with Horizontal Heterogeneity," ESE Discussion Papers 94, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    4. Sotomayor, Marilda, 2007. "Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 357-380, August.

    More about this item


    uniqueness; matching; marriage;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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