Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-sided Matching
This paper analyses a sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility. The condition is easy to interpret, being based on the notion that a person's characteristics both form the basis of their attraction to the opposite sex, and determine their own sexual preferences.
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- Clark, Simon & Kanbur, Ravi, 2004.
"Stable partnerships, matching, and local public goods,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 905-925, August.
- Simon Clark & Ravi Kanbur, 2002. "Stable Partnerships, Matching, and Local Public Goods," ESE Discussion Papers 82, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Clark, Simon & Kanbur, Ravi, 2002. "Stable Partnerships, Matching, and Local Public Goods," Working Papers 127325, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
- Eeckhout, Jan, 2000. "On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-8, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)