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Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Author

Listed:
  • Marcelo A. Fernandez
  • Kirill Rudov
  • Leeat Yariv

Abstract

We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others' preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcelo A. Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers 29043, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29043
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    Cited by:

    1. Burkhard C. Schipper & Tina Danting Zhang, 2025. "Matching, Unanticipated Experiences, Divorce, Flirting, Rematching, Etc," Working Papers 371, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    2. Pietro Ortoleva & Evgenii Safonov & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Who Cares More? Allocation with Diverse Preference Intensities," Papers 2108.12025, arXiv.org.
    3. Kirill Rudov, 2024. "Fragile Stable Matchings," Papers 2403.12183, arXiv.org.
    4. Meisner, Vincent, 2021. "Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 289, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    5. Kamishiro, Yusuke & Vohra, Rajiv & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Signaling, screening, and core stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    6. Gregory Z. Gutin & Philip R. Neary & Anders Yeo, 2021. "Unique Stable Matchings," Papers 2106.12977, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    7. Vincent Meisner, 2023. "Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(5), pages 2733-2745, May.
    8. Timm Opitz & Christoph Schwaiger, 2023. "Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 388, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    9. Tatiana Daddario & Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2024. "An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(2), pages 567-592, September.
    10. Maxey, Tyler, 2024. "School choice with costly information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 248-268.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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