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Report NEP-DES-2021-08-23
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Marcelo A. Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2021, "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 29043, Jul.
- Felix Brandt & Patrick Lederer, 2021, "Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2108.04622, Aug, revised Jun 2023.
- Ryosuke Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2021, "A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1134, Jun.
- Xu Lang & Zaifu Yang, 2021, "Reduced-Form Allocations for Multiple Indivisible Objects under Constraints: A Revision," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 21/05, Aug.
- Dirk Bergemann & Edmund Yeh & Jinkun Zhang, 2021, "Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2297, Aug.
- Rida Laraki & Estelle Varloot, 2021, "Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2108.04705, Aug, revised Sep 2022.