Instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility
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DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.02.002
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- Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2014. "Instrumental Cardinal Concerns for Social Status in Two-Sided Matching with Non-Transferable Utility," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 095, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
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- Haagsma, Rein, 2018. "Income inequality and saving in a class society: The role of ordinal status," Economics Discussion Papers 2018-12, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Frédéric Gavrel, 2016. "Keeping Up with the Joneses as an Outcome of Getting Ahead of the Smiths. A Two-Stage Veblenian Status Game," Working Papers halshs-01319593, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Asymmetric information; Matching; Social preferences; Instrumental approach; Social status;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Statistics
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