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Co-ranking mates: Assortative matching in marriage markets

Author

Listed:
  • Legros, Patrick
  • Newman, Andrew

Abstract

We show that co-ranking is the necessary and sufficient condition for assortative matching with strictly nontransferable utility. This condition is equivalent to the GID condition in Legros and Newman (2007) and is a weakening of existing conditions for equilibrium uniqueness.

Suggested Citation

  • Legros, Patrick & Newman, Andrew, 2010. "Co-ranking mates: Assortative matching in marriage markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 177-179, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:3:p:177-179
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Clark Simon, 2006. "The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-28, December.
    2. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    3. Eeckhout, Jan, 2000. "On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-8, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2014. "Instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 174-189.
    2. Fernanda Estevan & Thomas Gall; Patrick Legros; Andrew F. Newman, 2014. "College Admission and High School Integration," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2014_26, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    3. Alkan, Ahmet & Anbarci, Nejat & Sarpça, Sinan, 2012. "An exploration in school formation: Income vs. Ability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 500-504.
    4. Rania Gihleb & Kevin Lang, 2016. "Educational Homogamy and Assortative Mating Have Not Increased," NBER Working Papers 22927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. repec:aea:jeclit:v:55:y:2017:i:2:p:493-544 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-015-0522-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2014. "Household consumption when marriage is stable," IFS Working Papers W14/26, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    8. Rania Gihleb, 2014. "Educational Homogamy and Assortative Mating Have Not Increased," Working Paper 6052, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    9. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2013. "Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 143-156.
    10. repec:ibn:ibrjnl:v:11:y:2018:i:2:p:44-54 is not listed on IDEAS

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