Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off ?
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More about this item
Keywords
Matching; envyfreeness; efficiency; priorities; preferences; matching algorithms;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2023-01-02 (Economic Design)
- NEP-URE-2023-01-02 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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