The performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice
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- de Haan, Monique & Gautier, Pieter A. & Oosterbeek, Hessel & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2015. "The Performance of School Assignment Mechanisms in Practice," IZA Discussion Papers 9118, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Ran I. Shorrer & Sandor Sovago, 2017. "Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-107/V, Tinbergen Institute.
- Artemov, Georgy, 2021. "Assignment mechanisms: Common preferences and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
- Adam J. Kapor & Christopher A. Neilson & Seth D. Zimmerman, 2020.
"Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(5), pages 1274-1315, May.
- Adam Kapor & Christopher A. Neilson & Seth D. Zimmerman, 2017. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms," Working Papers 612, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Adam Kapor & Christopher A. Neilson & Seth D. Zimmerman, 2018. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers 25096, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet & Yinghua He, 2019.
"Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1486-1529, April.
- Fack, Gabrielle & Grenet, Julien & He, Yinghua, 2015. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," TSE Working Papers 15-607, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2017.
- Yinghua He & Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet, 2020. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," Working Papers halshs-01215998, HAL.
- Yinghua He & Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet, 2020. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," PSE Working Papers halshs-01215998, HAL.
- Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet & Yinghua He, 2019. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," Post-Print hal-02304681, HAL.
- Basteck, Christian & Mantovani, Marco, 2021. "Aiding applicants: Leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2021-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Nirav Mehta, 2017.
"Competition In Public School Districts: Charter School Entry, Student Sorting, And School Input Determination,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1089-1116, November.
- Nirav Mehta, 2012. "Competition in Public School Districts: Charter School Entry, Student Sorting, and School Input Determination," 2012 Meeting Papers 42, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Nirav Mehta, 2012. "Competition in Public School Districts: Charter School Entry, Student Sorting, and School Input Determination," University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP) Working Papers 20123, University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP).
- Mehta, Nirav, 2016. "Competition in Public School Districts: Charter School Entry, Student Sorting, and School Input Determination," EconStor Preprints 180847, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak, 2017.
"Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 1373-1432, September.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak, 2015. "Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation," NBER Working Papers 21705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Angrist, Joshua & Narita, Yusuke & Pathak, Parag A., 2016. "Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation," IZA Discussion Papers 10429, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Joshua D. Angrist & Yusuke Narita & Parag A. Pathak, 2017. "Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2080, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Tong Wang & Congyi Zhou, 2020. "High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(3), pages 215-269, December.
- Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin, 2020. "What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
- Inácio Bó & C.-Philipp Heller, 2017. "Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(3), pages 545-572, March.
- Li, Mengling, 2020. "Ties matter: Improving efficiency in course allocation by allowing ties," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 354-384.
- Hoyer, B. & Stroh-Maraun, N., 2020. "Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 453-481.
- André Veski & Péter Biró & Kaire Põder & Triin Lauri, 2017. "Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 2(1), pages 57-104, December.
- Chen, Yan & He, YingHua, 2021. "Information acquisition and provision in school choice: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
- Fack, Gabrielle & Grenet, Julien & He, Yinghua, 2015. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice," CEPR Discussion Papers 10907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Erdil, Aytek & Ergin, Haluk, 2017. "Two-sided matching with indifferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 268-292.
- Britta Hoyer & Nadja Stroh-Maraun, 2017. "Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse," Working Papers CIE 110, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
- repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-01215998 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito & Narita, Yusuke, 2016. "Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 186-211.
- Ashlagi, Itai & Nikzad, Afshin & Romm, Assaf, 2019. "Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 167-187.
- Christopher Neilson & Mohammad Akbarpour & Adam Kapor & Winnie van Dijk & Seth Zimmerman, 2020. "Centralized School Choice with Unequal Outside Options," Working Papers 644, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Christian Haas, 2021. "Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences: Using Heuristics to Improve Properties of Stable Matchings," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 57(4), pages 1115-1148, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
Boston mechanism; deferred acceptance mechanism; ex-ante efficiency; ex-post efficiency; school choice; strategic behavior;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EDU-2015-06-20 (Education)
- NEP-GTH-2015-06-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-URE-2015-06-20 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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