Gaming the Boston School Choice Mechanism in Beijing
The Boston mechanism is criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performance compared to the Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance mechanism (DA). Using school choice data from Beijing, I investigate parents’ behavior under the Boston mechanism, taking into account parents’ possible mistakes when they strategize. Evidence shows that parents are overcautious as they play "safe" strategies too often. Wealthier/more educated parents are less overcautious and perform slightly better because they have better outside options while not being any more adept at strategizing. Parents who are always truth-telling experience a utility gain in switching from the Boston mechanism to the DA, equivalent to a 7.1% decrease in the distance to a school. Among them, 44.2% are better off under the DA, while 35.5% are worse off.
|Date of creation:||May 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: (+33) 5 61 12 86 23|
Web page: http://www.tse-fr.eu/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kenneth Kovash & Steven D. Levitt, 2009. "Professionals Do Not Play Minimax: Evidence from Major League Baseball and the National Football League," NBER Working Papers 15347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sebastian Braun & Nadja Dwenger & Dorothea Kübler, 2007.
"Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany,"
SFB 649 Discussion Papers
SFB649DP2007-070, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Braun Sebastian & Dwenger Nadja & Kübler Dorothea, 2010. "Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralized University Admissions in Germany," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-38, March.
- Braun, Sebastian & Dwenger, Nadja & Kübler, Dorothea, 2007. "Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 3261, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- SÃ¶nmez, Tayfun & Pathak, Parag A. & Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Roth, Alvin, 2005.
"The Boston Public School Match,"
2562764, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Joana Pais & Ágnes Pintér, 2006.
"School Choice and Information An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms,"
Working Papers Department of Economics
2006/14, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
- Pais, Joana & Pintér, Ágnes, 2008. "School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 303-328, September.
- Joana Pais & Agnes Pinter, 2007. "School Choice and Information. An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 018, University of Siena.
- Patrick Bajari & Han Hong & John Krainer & Denis Nekipelov, 2006.
"Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interaction,"
NBER Working Papers
12013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bajari, Patrick & Hong, Han & Krainer, John & Nekipelov, Denis, 2010. "Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interactions," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 28(4), pages 469-482.
- Clayton Featherstone & Muriel Niederle, 2008. "Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation," NBER Working Papers 14618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
- P.-A. Chiappori, 2002. "Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1138-1151, September.
- Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sonmez, 2008. "Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1636-52, September.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521747387 is not listed on IDEAS
- Ali Hortaçsu & Steven L. Puller, 2008. "Understanding strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 86-114.
- Yan Chen & Tayfun Sönmez, 2004.
"School Choice: An Experimental Study,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
622, Boston College Department of Economics.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521766555 is not listed on IDEAS
- Aradillas-Lopez, Andres, 2012. "Pairwise-difference estimation of incomplete information games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 168(1), pages 120-140.
- Sebastian Braun & Nadja Dwenger & Dorothea Kübler, 2007. "Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 759, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Daniel McFadden & Kenneth Train, 2000. "Mixed MNL models for discrete response," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(5), pages 447-470.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:26414. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.