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Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions

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  • Fack, Gabrielle
  • Grenet, Julien
  • He, Yinghua

Abstract

We propose novel approaches and tests for estimating student preferences with data from centralized matching mechanisms, like the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance, when students are strictly ranked by, e.g., test scores. Without requiring truth-telling to be the unique equilibrium, we show that the matching is (asymptotically) stable, or justified-envy-free, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she is qualified for ex post. Having illustrated the approaches in simulations, we apply them to school choice data from Paris and demonstrate evidence supporting stability but not truth-telling. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Fack, Gabrielle & Grenet, Julien & He, Yinghua, 2015. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," TSE Working Papers 15-607, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:29845
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ran I. Shorrer & Sandor Sovago, 2017. "Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College Admissions Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 17-107/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Klijn, Flip & Pais, Joana & Vorsatz, Marc, 2020. "Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    3. Adam J. Kapor & Christopher A. Neilson & Seth D. Zimmerman, 2020. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(5), pages 1274-1315, May.
    4. Fanny Landaud & Son Thierry Ly & Éric Maurin, 2020. "Competitive Schools and the Gender Gap in the Choice of Field of Study," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 55(1), pages 278-308.
    5. Laurent Gobillon & Dominique Meurs & Sébastien Roux, 2017. "Differences in positions along a hierarchy: Counterfactuals based on an assignment," Working Papers halshs-01513012, HAL.
    6. Ha, Wei & Kang, Le & Song, Yang, 2020. "College matching mechanisms and matching stability: Evidence from a natural experiment in China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 206-226.
    7. Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet & Yinghua He, 2019. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1486-1529, April.
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    10. Nikhil Agarwal & Paulo J. Somaini, 2019. "Revealed Preference Analysis of School Choice Models," NBER Working Papers 26568, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Laurent Gobillon & Dominique Meurs & Sébastien Roux, 2017. "Differences in positions along a hierarchy: Counterfactuals based on an assignment model," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-29, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    12. Grenet, Julien & He, Yinghua & Kübler, Dorothea, 2019. "Decentralizing centralized matching markets: Implications from early offers in university admissions," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2019-208, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    13. Aue, Robert & Bach, Maximilian & Heigle, Julia & Klein, Thilo & Pfeiffer, Friedhelm & Zapp, Kristina, 2020. "The implication of school admission rules for segregation and educational inequality: Research report," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 223254.
    14. Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani & Christopher Neilson, 2019. "Negative Externalities of Off Platform Options and the Efficiency of Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Working Papers 635, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    15. Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John List & Axel Ockenfels, 2020. "Market Design, Human Behavior and Management," Artefactual Field Experiments 00685, The Field Experiments Website.
    16. Hoyer, B. & Stroh-Maraun, N., 2020. "Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 453-481.
    17. Kutscher, Macarena & Nath, Shanjukta & Urzua, Sergio, 2020. "Centralized Admission Systems and School Segregation: Evidence from a National Reform," IZA Discussion Papers 13305, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Gale-Shapley Deferred-Acceptance Mechanism; School Choice; Stable Matching; Student Preferences; Admission Criteria;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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