IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/anr/reveco/v3y2011p513-536.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment

Author

Listed:
  • Parag A. Pathak

    () (Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142, and NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138)

Abstract

The mechanism design approach to student assignment involves the theoretical, empirical, and experimental study of systems used to allocate students into schools around the world. Recent practical experience designing systems for student assignment has raised new theoretical questions for the theory of matching and assignment. This article reviews some of this recent literature, highlighting how issues from the field motivated theoretical developments and emphasizing how the dialogue may be a road map for other areas of applied mechanism design. Finally, it concludes with some open questions.

Suggested Citation

  • Parag A. Pathak, 2011. "The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 513-536, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:anr:reveco:v:3:y:2011:p:513-536
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080213
    Download Restriction: Full text downloads are only available to subscribers. Visit the abstract page for more information.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James J. Heckman & Jora Stixrud & Sergio Urzua, 2006. "The Effects of Cognitive and Noncognitive Abilities on Labor Market Outcomes and Social Behavior," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 411-482, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    school choice; market design; matching;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:anr:reveco:v:3:y:2011:p:513-536. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (http://www.annualreviews.org). General contact details of provider: http://www.annualreviews.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.