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Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey

Author

Listed:
  • Hayri Alper Arslan

    (University of Texas at San Antonio)

  • Yang Song

    (Colgate University)

  • Tong Wang

    (The University of Tokyo)

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of reducing information uncertainty on matching outcomes in a college choice setting. Turkey reformed its college admissions in 1999, changing the preference submission process for 4-year programs from pre-exam to post-exam submission, both under the constrained Deferred Acceptance mechanism. A conceptual framework illustrates that the reform changed matching outcomes in two ways: (i) fewer programs with unfilled seats, (ii) more assortative matching between students and programs, i.e., higher cutoff ranks for more highly ranked programs. Results from a difference-in-differences strategy confirm such predictions and find that the reform led to less under-capacity among lower-ranked programs and stronger assortative matching between high-achieving students and highly ranked programs. Moreover, we find some suggestive evidence that the post-exam submission may have led to fewer enrolled students overall but more female students in 4-year programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Hayri Alper Arslan & Yang Song & Tong Wang, 2024. "Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(1), pages 189-241, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:28:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s10058-023-00339-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00339-5
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    College admission; Matching stability; Post-exam submission; Deferred acceptance mechanism; Turkey;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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