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Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition

Author

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  • Georgy Artemov

Abstract

I study costly information acquisition in a two-sided matching problem, such as matching applicants to schools. An applicant's utility is a sum of common and idiosyncratic components. The idiosyncratic component is unknown to the applicant but can be learned at a cost. When applicants are assigned using an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism, too few acquire information, generating a significant welfare loss. Affirmative action and other realistic policies may lead to a Pareto improvement. As incentives to acquire information differ across mechanisms, ignoring such incentives may lead to incorrect welfare assessments, for example, in comparing a popular Immediate Assignment and an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Georgy Artemov, 2021. "Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition," Papers 2101.06885, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2101.06885
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    Cited by:

    1. Lingbo Huang & Jun Zhang, 2025. "Bundled School Choice," Papers 2501.04241, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
    2. Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler & Siqi Pan, 2023. "Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), pages 1447-1490, November.
    3. Maxey, Tyler, 2024. "School choice with costly information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 248-268.
    4. Li Chen, 2023. "Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(4), pages 803-820, August.
    5. Kovač, Dejan & Neilson, Christopher A. & Raith, Johanna, 2025. "College application choices in a repeated Deferred Acceptance (DA) Setting: Empirical evidence from Croatia," IWH Discussion Papers 9/2025, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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