IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/par283.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Georgy Artemov

Personal Details

First Name:Georgy
Middle Name:
Last Name:Artemov
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:par283
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://findanexpert.unimelb.edu.au/profile/179354-georgy-artemov
Terminal Degree:2007 Economics Department; Brown University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Faculty of Business and Economics
University of Melbourne

Melbourne, Australia
http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/
RePEc:edi:demelau (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Georgy Artemov & Yeon-Koo Che & YingHua He, 2022. "Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents," Papers 2207.13939, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
  2. Georgy Artemov, 2021. "Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition," Papers 2101.06885, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.
  3. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Georgy Artemov & Yeon-Koo Che & YingHua He, 2023. "Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(2), pages 270-320.
  2. Artemov, Georgy, 2021. "Assignment mechanisms: Common preferences and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
  3. Artemov, Georgy, 2020. "Integer game with delay," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
  4. Artemov, Georgy, 2015. "Time and Nash implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 229-236.
  5. Artemov, Georgy, 2014. "An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 380-385.
  6. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.
  7. Georgy Artemov & Sven Feldmann & Simon Loertscher, 2012. "For the Student: Matching and Economic Design," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 45(1), pages 134-141, February.
  8. Georgy Artemov, 2008. "Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 321-331, March.
  9. Georgy Artemov, 2006. "Imminent Nash Implementation as a Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(14), pages 1-8.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Georgy Artemov & Yeon-Koo Che & YingHua He, 2022. "Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents," Papers 2207.13939, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.

    Cited by:

    1. Klein, Thilo & Aue, Robert & Ortega, Josué, 2024. "School choice with independent versus consolidated districts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 170-205.
    2. Shorrer, Ran I. & Sóvágó, Sándor, 2024. "Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: The effect of admission selectivity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 167-182.
    3. Di Feng & Yun Liu, 2024. "Informational Size in School Choice," Papers 2407.11273, arXiv.org.

  2. Georgy Artemov, 2021. "Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition," Papers 2101.06885, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.

    Cited by:

    1. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea & Pan, Siqi, 2021. "Costly Information Acquisition in Centralized Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 280, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    2. Lingbo Huang & Jun Zhang, 2025. "Bundled School Choice," Papers 2501.04241, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2025.
    3. Maxey, Tyler, 2024. "School choice with costly information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 248-268.
    4. Li Chen, 2023. "Timing of preference submissions under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(4), pages 803-820, August.

  3. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Working Papers 1332, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    3. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
    4. Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2583-2595.
    5. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design Abstract: We assess the strength of the different conditions identified in the literature of robust mechanism design. We focus on three conditions," Working Papers 2010-6, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    6. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2021. "A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: The Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1248, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: A Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation," Working Papers wp2009_0908, CEMFI.
    8. Di Tillio, Alfredo, 2011. "A robustness result for rationalizable implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 301-305, May.
    9. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000155, David K. Levine.
    10. Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio, 2015. "Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 77-102.
    11. Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via Transfers with Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1126, Barcelona School of Economics.
    12. Kyungmin Kim & Antonio Penta, 2012. "A Robustly Efficient Auction," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 248, Collegio Carlo Alberto.

Articles

  1. Georgy Artemov & Yeon-Koo Che & YingHua He, 2023. "Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents," Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 1(2), pages 270-320.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Artemov, Georgy, 2021. "Assignment mechanisms: Common preferences and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Artemov, Georgy, 2015. "Time and Nash implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 229-236.

    Cited by:

    1. Artemov, Georgy, 2020. "Integer game with delay," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    2. Ritesh Jain, 2019. "Rationalizable Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    3. Ville Korpela, 2023. "Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(4), pages 993-1007, December.
    4. Korpela Ville, 2016. "Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility," Discussion Papers 110, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    5. Jianxin Yi, 2021. "Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 279-288, September.

  4. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.

    Cited by:

    1. Makoto Shimoji & Paul Schweinzer, 2012. "Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners," Discussion Papers 12/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
    2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei, 2023. "Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    3. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Pietro Tebaldi, 2019. "Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 737-763, October.
    4. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rule," Post-Print hal-02980107, HAL.
    5. Müller, Christoph, 2020. "Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    6. Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    7. Marcus Pivato, 2016. "Statistical utilitarianism," Post-Print hal-02980108, HAL.
    8. Giacomo Rubbini, 2023. "Mechanism Design without Rational Expectations," Papers 2305.07472, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    9. Núñez, Matías & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 285-305.
    10. Modibo Camara & Jason Hartline & Aleck Johnsen, 2020. "Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior," Papers 2009.05518, arXiv.org.
    11. Ziegler, Gabriel, 2022. "Informational robustness of common belief in rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 592-597.
    12. Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2021. "Continuous Level-k Mechanism Design," Working Papers 2021-002, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    13. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & 国本, 隆 & Sun, Yifei, 2015. "Implementation with Transfers," Discussion Papers 2015-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    14. Müller, Christoph, 2016. "Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 407-450.
    15. Kunimoto, Takashi, 2020. "Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 62-73.
    16. Geoffroy de Clippel & Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano, 2014. "Mechanism Design with Bounded Depth of Reasoning and Small Modeling Mistakes," Working Papers 2014-7, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    17. Oury, Marion, 2015. "Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 656-677.

  5. Georgy Artemov, 2008. "Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 321-331, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
    2. Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "What Have We Learned From Market Design?," NBER Working Papers 13530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Fuhito Kojima, 2007. "Matching and Price Competition: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 1027-1031, June.
    4. Julio González-Díaz & Ron Siegel, 2013. "Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 835-844, November.

  6. Georgy Artemov, 2006. "Imminent Nash Implementation as a Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(14), pages 1-8.

    Cited by:

    1. Artemov, Georgy, 2015. "Time and Nash implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 229-236.
    2. Guha, Brishti, 2014. "Reinterpreting King Solomon's problem: Malice and mechanism design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 125-132.
    3. Cheng-Zhong Qin & Chun-Lei Yang, 2009. "Make a guess: a robust mechanism for King Solomon’s dilemma," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 259-268, May.
    4. Yuk-fai Fong & Peter Eso, 2008. "Wait and See," 2008 Meeting Papers 303, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Brishti Guha, 2017. "Testing for Malice," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(1), pages 327-335.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-DES: Economic Design (2) 2021-02-08 2022-09-12
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2007-06-23 2007-07-27
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2021-02-08 2022-09-12

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Georgy Artemov should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.