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Report NEP-DES-2021-02-08
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Georgy Artemov, 2021, "Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2101.06885, Jan, revised Oct 2021.
- Mandal, Pinaki & Roy, Souvik, 2021, "Strategy-proof Allocation of Indivisible Goods when Preferences are Single-peaked," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 105320, Jan.
- Vijay V. Vazirani, 2021, "The General Graph Matching Game: Approximate Core," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2101.07390, Jan, revised Jul 2021.
- Takaaki Abe, 2020, "Stable Coalition Structures and Power Indices for Majority Voting," Working Papers, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics, number 2015, Oct.
- Maximilian Mordig & Riccardo Della Vecchia & Nicol`o Cesa-Bianchi & Bernhard Scholkopf, 2021, "Two-Sided Matching Markets in the ELLIS 2020 PhD Program," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2101.12080, Jan, revised Mar 2021.
- Philipp Harfst & Damien Bol & Jean-François Laslier, 2021, "Designing Preference Voting," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03033239, DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102262.
- Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2021, "Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8863.
- Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Hannu Vartiainen, 2021, "Implementation with farsighted agents," Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics, number 140, Jan.