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Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility

Author

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  • Korpela Ville

    (Department of Economics, University of Turku)

Abstract

Often preferences of agents are such that any sensible goal of the collective must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demand that in this case all alternatives are equilibrium outcomes of the social choice mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is to predict the outcome of a game, we could just as well demand that there are no equilibria at all. Although this may seem innocent, and in a technical sense that’s right, it is a neglected path to possibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Korpela Ville, 2016. "Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility," Discussion Papers 110, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp110
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    File URL: http://ace-economics.fi/kuvat/dp110.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Condorcet Criterion; Collective Decision Making; Implementation; Impossibility Result; Nash Equilibrium; Social Choice Theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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