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Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty

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  • Oury, Marion

Abstract

Following the notion of continuous implementation, we consider a situation where the social planner is not entirely sure of the validity of his model and thus wants the social choice function to be not only (partially) implemented at all types of the initial model, but also at all types “close” to those types. In addition, we assume that the social planner also has some doubts on the payoffs of the outcomes and thus wants his prediction to be robust when these payoffs are close but not exactly equal to those in the initial model. Under this local payoff uncertainty, the present paper establishes the following full characterization result for finite mechanisms: a social choice function is continuously implementable if and only if it is fully implementable in rationalizable strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Oury, Marion, 2015. "Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 656-677.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:159:y:2015:i:pa:p:656-677
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Pęski, 2011. "Critical Types," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 907-937.
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    13. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Yi-Chun & Kunimoto, Takashi & Sun, Yifei & Xiong, Siyang, 2021. "Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 181-197.
    2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Mueller-Frank, Manuel & Pai, Mallesh M., 2022. "Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    High order beliefs; Robust implementation;

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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