IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v80y2013icp147-156.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The e-mail game phenomenon

Author

Listed:
  • Chen, Yi-Chun
  • Xiong, Siyang

Abstract

The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis — types in finite or common-prior models — display strategic discontinuity in simple games.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Yi-Chun & Xiong, Siyang, 2013. "The e-mail game phenomenon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 147-156.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:147-156 DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825613000328
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Strzalecki, Tomasz, 2014. "Depth of Reasoning and Higher Order Beliefs," Scholarly Articles 14397608, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, pages 275-309.
    3. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 989-1018.
    4. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, pages 19-65.
    5. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, pages 19-65.
    6. Yi‐Chun Chen & Siyang Xiong, 2013. "Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 825-847, March.
    7. Eddie Dekel & Yossi Feinberg, 2006. "Non-Bayesian Testing of a Stochastic Prediction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, pages 893-906.
      • Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Topologies on Type," Discussion Papers 1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 2, pages 31-41 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, pages 275-309.
    10. Stephen Morris, 2002. "Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-mail Game," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 433-445.
    11. Yi-Chun Chen & Alfredo Di Tillio & Eduardo Faingold & Siyang Xiong, 2012. "The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1875, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    12. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2004. "On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Discussion Paper Series dp350, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    13. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1993. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 612-643, August.
    14. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2007. "A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 365-400, March.
    15. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
    16. Morris, Stephen & Skiadas, Costis, 2000. "Rationalizable Trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 311-323, May.
    17. Strzalecki, Tomasz, 2014. "Depth of reasoning and higher order beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 108-122.
    18. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 385-391.
    19. Xiong, Siyang & Chen, Yi-Chun & di Tillio, Alfredo & Faingold, Eduardo, 2010. "Uniform topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    20. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October.
    21. Jean-Philippe Platteau & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2004. "Collective Action, Heterogeneous Loyalties and Path Dependence: Micro-evidence from Senegal," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), pages 417-445.
    22. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Interim correlated rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, pages 15-40.
    23. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2006. "On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 213-233, January.
    24. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Interim correlated rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, pages 15-40.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Yi-Chun & Takahashi, Satoru & Xiong, Siyang, 2014. "The robust selection of rationalizability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 448-475.
    2. Oury, Marion, 2015. "Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 656-677.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:147-156. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.