IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v80y2013icp147-156.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The e-mail game phenomenon

Author

Listed:
  • Chen, Yi-Chun
  • Xiong, Siyang

Abstract

The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis — types in finite or common-prior models — display strategic discontinuity in simple games.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Yi-Chun & Xiong, Siyang, 2013. "The e-mail game phenomenon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 147-156.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:147-156
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825613000328
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.010?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stephen Morris, 2002. "Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-mail Game," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 18(4), pages 433-445.
    2. Strzalecki, Tomasz, 2014. "Depth of reasoning and higher order beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 108-122.
    3. , & , & ,, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September.
    4. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    5. , C. & ,, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 19-65, March.
    6. Yi‐Chun Chen & Siyang Xiong, 2013. "Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 825-847, March.
    7. Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 2, pages 31-41, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    8. Yi-Chun Chen & Alfredo Di Tillio & Eduardo Faingold & Siyang Xiong, 2012. "The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1875, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    9. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2006. "On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 213-233, January.
    10. , & , & ,, 2007. "Interim correlated rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 15-40, March.
    11. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2007. "A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 365-400, March.
    12. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
    13. Morris, Stephen & Skiadas, Costis, 2000. "Rationalizable Trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 311-323, May.
    14. MERTENS, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1985. "Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 608, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
    16. , & , & , & ,, 2010. "Uniform topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(3), September.
    17. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2003. "Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 38-72, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Oury, Marion, 2015. "Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 656-677.
    2. Chen, Yi-Chun & Takahashi, Satoru & Xiong, Siyang, 2014. "The robust selection of rationalizability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 448-475.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2013. "Finite-order type spaces and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 689-719.
    2. Aviad Heifetz & Willemien Kets, 2013. "Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naiveté," Discussion Papers 1573, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2023. "Continuous level-k mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 481-501.
    4. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    5. Chen, Yi-Chun & Mueller-Frank, Manuel & Pai, Mallesh M., 2022. "Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    6. Strzalecki, Tomasz, 2014. "Depth of reasoning and higher order beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 108-122.
    7. Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2009. "An Explicit Approach to Modeling Finite-Order Type Spaces and Applications," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt8hq7j89k, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    8. Kota Murayama, 2020. "Robust predictions under finite depth of reasoning," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 59-84, January.
    9. Kota Murayama, 2015. "Robust Predictions under Finite Depth of Reasoning," Discussion Paper Series DP2015-28, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    10. Heifetz, Aviad & Kets, Willemien, 2018. "Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    11. Yildiz, Muhamet, 2015. "Invariance to representation of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 142-156.
    12. Willemien Kets, 2014. "Finite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Play in Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1569, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Di Tillio Alfredo & Grillo Edoardo & Penta Antonio, 2011. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-40, March.
    14. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Takahashi, Satoru, 2017. "Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 329-371.
    15. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2021. "Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2299R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2021.
    16. Yi-Chun Chen & Alfredo Di Tillio & Eduardo Faingold & Siyang Xiong, 2012. "The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000517, David K. Levine.
    17. Willemien Kets, 2012. "Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty," Discussion Papers 1547, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    18. Annie Liang, 2016. "Games of Incomplete Information Played by Statisticians," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-028, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jan 2016.
    19. Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2007. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 200-212, July.
    20. Gizatulina, Alia & Hellwig, Martin, 2017. "The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 385-416.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:147-156. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.