The e-mail game phenomenon
The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show that almost all types involved in economic analysis — types in finite or common-prior models — display strategic discontinuity in simple games.
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