Coordination, Communication, and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-mail Game
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Other versions of this item:
- Stephen Morris, 2004. "Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm340, Yale School of Management.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gabriel Desgranges & Céline Rochon, 2013. "Conformism and public news," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 1061-1090, April.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006.
"The pros and cons of higher transparency: the case of speculative attacks,"
Recherches économiques de Louvain,
De Boeck Université, vol. 72(3), pages 215-246.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Post-Print halshs-00180086, HAL.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2005. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Working Papers 0502, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Jean-Pierre Allegret & Camille Cornand, 2006. "The Pros and Cons of Higher Transparency: The Case of Speculative Attacks," Post-Print halshs-00137469, HAL.
- Jean-Pierre ALLEGRET & Camille CORNAND, 2006. "The pros and cons of higher transparency : the case of speculative attacks," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2006031, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Kris De Jaegher, 2015.
"Beneficial Long Communication in the Multiplayer Electronic Mail Game,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 233-251, November.
- K.J.M. De Jaegher, 2015. "Beneficial Long Communication in the Multi-Player Electronic Mail Game," Working Papers 15-09, Utrecht School of Economics.
- repec:use:tkiwps:3131 is not listed on IDEAS
- Chen, Yi-Chun & Xiong, Siyang, 2013. "The e-mail game phenomenon," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 147-156.
- Uwe Dulleck, 2002. "The e-mail game revisited - Modeling rough inductive reasoning," Vienna Economics Papers 0211, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Qin, Cheng-Zhong & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2013. "Finite-order type spaces and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 689-719.
More about this item
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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