Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game
Common knowledge plays an important role in coordination problems and coordination problems are central to many areas of economic policy. In this paper, I review some common knowledge puzzles culminating in the electronic mail game. These puzzles may seem distant from practical concerns. However, I then argue why insights derived from this literature are useful in interpreting empirical evidence of how people coordinate under uncertainty and in understanding the role of communication in coordinating behaviour.
|Date of creation:||28 Jul 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://icf.som.yale.edu/|
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