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The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match

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  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu
  • Nikhil Agarwal
  • Parag A. Pathak

Abstract

Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC’s school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80% of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement.

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  • Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Nikhil Agarwal & Parag A. Pathak, 2015. "The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match," NBER Working Papers 21046, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21046
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    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo M Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2019. "Strategy-proofness in the Large," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 81-116.
    2. Calsamiglia, Caterina & Güell, Maia, 2014. "The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona," IZA Discussion Papers 8202, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Carvalho, José-Raimundo & Magnac, Thierry & Xiong, Qizhou, 2016. "College Choice and the Selection of Mechanisms: A Structural Empirical Analysis," IWH Discussion Papers 3/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    4. Caterina Calsamiglia & Chao Fu & Maia Güell, 2014. "Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives," Working Papers 2014-21, FEDEA.
    5. Adam J. Kapor & Christopher A. Neilson & Seth D. Zimmerman, 2020. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(5), pages 1274-1315, May.
    6. Gabrielle Fack & Julien Grenet & Yinghua He, 2019. "Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(4), pages 1486-1529, April.
    7. Carvalho, José-Raimundo & Magnac, Thierry & Xiong, Qizhou, 2014. "College Choice Allocation Mechanisms: Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals," IZA Discussion Papers 8550, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Estelle Cantillon, 2017. "Broadening the market design approach to school choice," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 613-634.
    9. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Parag A. Pathak & Jonathan Schellenberg & Christopher R. Walters, 2020. "Do Parents Value School Effectiveness?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(5), pages 1502-1539, May.
    10. Nikhil Agarwal, 2015. "An Empirical Model of the Medical Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 1939-1978, July.
    11. Machado, Cecilia & Szerman, Christiane, 2016. "Centralized Admission and the Student-College Match," IZA Discussion Papers 10251, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Che, Yeon-Koo & Tercieux, Olivier, 2018. "Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    13. Thierry Magnac, 2018. "Quels étudiants pour quelles universités ? Analyses empiriques de mécanismes d’allocation centralisée," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 69(5), pages 683-708.
    14. Christopher Avery & Parag A. Pathak, 2021. "The Distributional Consequences of Public School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(1), pages 129-152, January.
    15. Yinghua He & Antonio Miralles & Marek Pycia & Jianye Yan, 2018. "A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 272-314, August.
    16. Ho, Paul, 2023. "Global robust Bayesian analysis in large models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 608-642.
    17. Jonathan M.V. Davis, 2017. "The Short and Long Run Impacts of Centralized Clearinghouses: Evidence from Matching Teach For America Teachers to Schools," 2017 Papers pda791, Job Market Papers.
    18. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-01215998 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Pathak, Parag A. & Shi, Peng, 2021. "How well do structural demand models work? Counterfactual predictions in school choice," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 222(1), pages 161-195.
    20. Nikhil Agarwal & Paulo Somaini, 2018. "Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(2), pages 391-444, March.
    21. Bertoni, Marco & Gibbons, Stephen & Silva, Olmo, 2017. "School Choice during a Period of Radical School Reform: Evidence from the Academy Programme," IZA Discussion Papers 11162, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    22. Parag A. Pathak & Peng Shi, 2014. "Demand Modeling, Forecasting, and Counterfactuals, Part I," NBER Working Papers 19859, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Yeon-Koo Che & Youngwoo Koh, 2016. "Decentralized College Admissions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1295-1338.
    24. Andre Veski & Kaire Põder, 2016. "Strategies in the Tallinn School Choice Mechanism," Research in Economics and Business: Central and Eastern Europe, Tallinn School of Economics and Business Administration, Tallinn University of Technology, vol. 8(1).
    25. Csató, László, 2016. "Felsőoktatási rangsorok jelentkezői preferenciák alapján [University rankings on the basis of applicants preferences]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 27-61.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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