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An Empirical Model of the Medical Match

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  • Nikhil Agarwal

Abstract

This paper develops a framework for estimating preferences in a many-to-one matching market using only observed matches. I use pairwise stability and a vertical preference restriction on one side to identify preferences on both sides of the market. Counterfactual simulations are used to analyze the antitrust allegation that the centralized medical residency match is responsible for salary depression. Due to residents' willingness to pay for desirable programs and capacity constraints, salaries in any competitive equilibrium would remain, on average, at least $23,000 below the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the match is not the likely cause of low salaries. (JEL C78, I11, J31, J44, K21, L44)

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  • Nikhil Agarwal, 2015. "An Empirical Model of the Medical Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 1939-1978, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:105:y:2015:i:7:p:1939-78
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Carvalho, José-Raimundo & Magnac, Thierry & Xiong, Qizhou, 2016. "College Choice and the Selection of Mechanisms: A Structural Empirical Analysis," IWH Discussion Papers 3/2016, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    2. repec:eee:gamebe:v:108:y:2018:i:c:p:317-330 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Peng, Zixuan & Shan, Wenxuan & Guan, Feng & Yu, Bin, 2016. "Stable vessel-cargo matching in dry bulk shipping market with price game mechanism," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 76-94.
    4. Carvalho, José-Raimundo & Magnac, Thierry & Xiong, Qizhou, 2014. "College Choice Allocation Mechanisms: Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals," IZA Discussion Papers 8550, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    5. repec:hrv:faseco:34710163 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:eee:indorg:v:53:y:2017:i:c:p:241-266 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Donna, Javier & Schenone, Pablo & Veramendi, Gregory, 2015. "Networks, Frictions, and Price Dispersion," MPRA Paper 66999, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Ariel Pakes, 2016. "Empirical Tools and Competition Analysis: Past Progress and Current Problems," NBER Working Papers 22086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Alfred Galichon & Scott Kominers & Simon Weber, 2014. "An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5kmb4ke32h9, Sciences Po.
    10. Nikhil Agarwal & Paulo Somaini, 2018. "Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(2), pages 391-444, March.
    11. Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2014. "Two-sided matching with one-sided preferences," Working Papers halshs-00980794, HAL.
    12. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Nikhil Agarwal & Parag A. Pathak, 2015. "The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match," NBER Working Papers 21046, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Machado, Cecilia & Szerman, Christiane, 2016. "Centralized Admission and the Student-College Match," IZA Discussion Papers 10251, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    14. Joseph G. Altonji & Peter Arcidiacono & Arnaud Maurel, 2015. "The Analysis of Field Choice in College and Graduate School: Determinants and Wage Effects," NBER Working Papers 21655, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2017. "Two-Sided Matching with (almost) One-Sided Preferences," Working Papers halshs-01513384, HAL.
    16. Nikhil Agarwal & William Diamond, 2013. "Identification and Estimation in Two-Sided Matching Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1905, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2014.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

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