IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed006/176.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Eeckhout Condition and the Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matching

Author

Listed:
  • Sang-Chul Suh
  • Quan Wen

Abstract

We investigate an extensive form sequential matching game of perfect information. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential matching game leads to the unique stable matching when the Eeckhout Condition (2000) for existence of a unique stable matching holds, regardless of the sequence of agents. This result does not extend to preferences that violate the Eeckhout Condition, even if there is a unique stable matching.

Suggested Citation

  • Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2006. "The Eeckhout Condition and the Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matching," 2006 Meeting Papers 176, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed006:176
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2006/paper_176.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 1996. "A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 185-189, May.
    2. Alcalde, Jose, 1996. "Implementation of Stable Solutions to Marriage Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 240-254, April.
    3. Clark Simon, 2006. "The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-28, December.
    4. Eeckhout, Jan, 2000. "On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-8, October.
    5. Ma Jinpeng, 1995. "Stable Matchings and Rematching-Proof Equilibria in a Two-Sided Matching Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 352-369, August.
    6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2008. "Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(1), pages 163-174, June.
    2. Haeringer, Guillaume & Klijn, Flip, 2009. "Constrained school choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(5), pages 1921-1947, September.
    3. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 197-204, November.
    4. Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 18-33, March.
    5. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1997. "Games of Manipulation in Marriage Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 169-176, August.
    6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:20:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Ergin, Haluk & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 215-237, January.
    8. Alcalde, Jose & Revilla, Pablo, 1999. "The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 189-195, February.
    9. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M., 2005. "Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 304-317, November.
    10. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Preference Revelation Games and Strong Cores of Allocation Problems with Indivisibilities," ISER Discussion Paper 0651, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    11. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "On the Equivalence of G-weak and -strong Cores in the Marriage Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0652, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jul 2006.
    12. Ehlers, Lars & Massó, Jordi, 2015. "Matching markets under (in)complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 295-314.
    13. EHLERS, Lars & MASSO, Jordi, 2018. "Robust design in monotonic matching markets: A case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance," Cahiers de recherche 2018-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    14. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "On the equivalence of G-weak and -strong cores in the marriage problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(20), pages 1-8.
    15. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2015. "Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 165-185.
    16. Akahoshi, Takashi, 2014. "Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 7-13.
    17. Vincent Iehlé & Julien Jacqmin, 2023. "SIGEM : analyse de la procédure d’affectation dans les grandes écoles de management," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 74(2), pages 139-168.
    18. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2014. "Instrumental cardinal concerns for social status in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 174-189.
    19. Ortega, Josué, 2018. "Social integration in two-sided matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 119-126.
    20. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Implementation in generalized matching problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 429-439.
    21. Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 1996. "A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 185-189, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; unique stable matching; subgame perfect equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed006:176. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Christian Zimmermann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.