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Weakening Transferable Utility: the Case of Non-intersecting Pareto Curves

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  • Thomas Demuynck
  • Tom Potoms

Abstract

Transferable utility (TU) is a widely used assumption in economics. In this paper, we weaken the TU property to the setting where distinct Pareto frontiers have empty intersections. We call this the no-intersection property (NIP). We show that the NIP is strictly weaker than TU, but still maintains several desirable properties. We discuss the NIP property in relation to several models where TU has turned out to be a key assumption: models of assortative matching, the Coase theorem and Becker's Rotten Kid theorem. We also investigate classes of utility functions for which theNIP holds uniformly.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Demuynck & Tom Potoms, 2018. "Weakening Transferable Utility: the Case of Non-intersecting Pareto Curves," Working Papers ECARES 2018-17, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/271579
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pareto effciency; Transferable utility; Kaldor-Hicks compensation crite- rion; Assortative matching; Coase theorem; Rotten Kid theorem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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