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The marriage market, labor supply and education choice

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre-André Chiappori

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Columbia University)

  • Monica Costa Dias

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Institute for Fiscal Studies)

  • Costas Meghir

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Yale University)

Abstract

We develop an equilibrium lifecycle model of education, marriage and labor supply and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their investments in education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market. They then match based on the economic value of marriage and on preferences. Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intra-household allocation of resources. Following marriage households (married or single) save, supply labor and consume private and public under uncertainty. Marriage thus has the dual role of providing public goods and offering risk sharing. The model is estimated using the British HPS.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-André Chiappori & Monica Costa Dias & Costas Meghir, 2015. "The marriage market, labor supply and education choice," CeMMAP working papers CWP14/15, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:ifs:cemmap:14/15
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • I00 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - General - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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