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Continuous Matching with Single Peaked Preferences

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  • Flanders, Sam

Abstract

This paper derives several simple matching algorithms for special cases of a continuous two sided matching model where agents have single peaked preferences and face no costs or restrictions to matching. These algorithms allow matches to be computed as an explicit function of the parameters of the model, making them convenient for use in theoretical matching market models, such as dating markets. One such theoretical model is solved and analyzed. Finally, several possible extensions and topics for further study are explored, such as adding noise to observed types and allowing misreporting of type.

Suggested Citation

  • Flanders, Sam, 2013. "Continuous Matching with Single Peaked Preferences," MPRA Paper 53668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:53668
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53668/1/MPRA_paper_53668.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simon Clark, 2003. "Matching and Sorting with Horizontal Heterogeneity," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 94, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    2. Clark Simon, 2006. "The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-30, December.
    3. Simon Clark, 2007. "Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 171, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    4. Klumpp, Tilman, 2009. "Two-sided matching with spatially differentiated agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(5-6), pages 376-390, May.
    5. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2007. "Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1073-1102, July.
    6. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General

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