Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Flanders, Sam, 2014. "Matching Markets with N-Dimensional Preferences," MPRA Paper 53669, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Flanders, Sam, 2013. "Continuous Matching with Single Peaked Preferences," MPRA Paper 53668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jean Guillaume Forand & Vikram Maheshri, 2012. "(De)Regulation and Market Thickness," Working Papers 1202, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2012.
More about this item
Keywordsmatching; sorting; uniqueness; horizontal heterogeneity; marriage;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2007-10-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2007-10-06 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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