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Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like

Author

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  • Simon Clark

    ()

Abstract

This paper examines a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched to a similar partner, i.e. "like attracts like". Such preferences imply a unique equilibrium assignment describing the pattern of matching; however, the pattern of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of types among the two sexes.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Clark, 2007. "Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like," ESE Discussion Papers 171, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  • Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:171
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/id171_esedps.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Clark, Simon & Kanbur, Ravi, 2004. "Stable partnerships, matching, and local public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 905-925, August.
    2. Daniele Fabbri & Chiara Monfardini, 2008. "Style of practice and assortative mating: a recursive probit analysis of Caesarean section scheduling in Italy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(11), pages 1411-1423.
    3. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2007. "Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1073-1102, July.
    4. Gretsky, Neil E & Ostroy, Joseph M & Zame, William R, 1992. "The Nonatomic Assignment Model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(1), pages 103-127, January.
    5. Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1986. "The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 105-137, October.
    6. Fernandez, Raquel, 2002. "Education, segregation and marital sorting: theory and an application to the UK," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 993-1022, June.
    7. Phelps, Charles E., 2000. "Information diffusion and best practice adoption," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 223-264 Elsevier.
    8. M. Andrews & L. Gill & R. Upward, 2006. "High wage workers and low wage firms: Negative assortative matching or statistical artefact?," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0615, Economics, The University of Manchester.
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    Cited by:

    1. Flanders, Sam, 2014. "Matching Markets with N-Dimensional Preferences," MPRA Paper 53669, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Flanders, Sam, 2013. "Continuous Matching with Single Peaked Preferences," MPRA Paper 53668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Jean Guillaume Forand & Vikram Maheshri, 2012. "(De)Regulation and Market Thickness," Working Papers 1202, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2012.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    matching; sorting; uniqueness; horizontal heterogeneity; marriage;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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