Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like
This paper examines a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched to a similar partner, i.e. "like attracts like". Such preferences imply a unique equilibrium assignment describing the pattern of matching; however, the pattern of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of types among the two sexes.
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