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Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like

  • Simon Clark

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This paper examines a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched to a similar partner, i.e. "like attracts like". Such preferences imply a unique equilibrium assignment describing the pattern of matching; however, the pattern of assortment in equilibrium is found to depend critically on the distribution of types among the two sexes.

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File URL: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/id171_esedps.pdf
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Paper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 171.

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Length: 23
Date of creation: 27 Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:171
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  1. Simon Clark & Ravi Kanbur, 2002. "Stable Partnerships, Matching, and Local Public Goods," ESE Discussion Papers 82, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  2. Daniele Fabbri & Chiara Monfardini, 2008. "Style of practice and assortative mating: a recursive probit analysis of Caesarean section scheduling in Italy," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(11), pages 1411-1423.
  3. Fernandez, Raquel, 2002. "Education, segregation and marital sorting: theory and an application to the UK," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 993-1022, June.
  4. Gretsky, Neil E & Ostroy, Joseph M & Zame, William R, 1992. "The Nonatomic Assignment Model," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 103-27, January.
  5. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2002. "Beauty is a Beast, Frog is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-149, Boston University - Department of Economics, revised Nov 2004.
  6. M. Andrews & L. Gill & R. Upward, 2006. "High wage workers and low wage firms: Negative assortative matching or statistical artefact?," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0615, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  7. Phelps, Charles E., 2000. "Information diffusion and best practice adoption," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 223-264 Elsevier.
  8. Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1986. "The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 105-137, October.
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