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Monotone matching in perfect and imperfect worlds

Listed author(s):
  • Patrick Legros
  • Andrew Newman

We study frictionless matching models in large production economies with and without market imperfections and/or incentive problems. We provide necessary and sufficient distribution-free conditions for monotone matching which depend on the relationship between what we call the segregation payoff - a generalization of the individually rational payoff - and the feasible set for a pair of types. Imperfections have two distinct effects that are relevant for equilibrium matching patterns: they can overwhelm the complementarity properties of the production technology and they can introduce nontransferabilities that make equilibrium matching inefficient. We also use our framework to reveal the source of differences in the comparative static properties of some models in the literature and to explore the effects of distribution on the equilibrium matching pattern.

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Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/7032.

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Date of creation: Oct 2002
Publication status: Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (2002) v.69 n° 4,p.925-942
Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/7032
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  1. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
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  13. Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1992. "Large Games and Economies With Effective Small Groups," Discussion Paper Serie B 215, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 1992.
  14. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1979. "A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(4), pages 719-748, August.
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  17. Fernandez, Raquel & Gali, Jordi, 1997. "To Each According to ...?: Markets, Tournaments, and The Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints," Working Papers 97-11, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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