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To Infinity and Beyond: A General Framework for Scaling Economic Theories

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  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski
  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Ran I. Shorrer

Abstract

Many economic theory models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. We provide a principled framework for scaling results from such models by removing these finiteness assumptions. Our sufficient conditions are on the theorem statement only, and not on its proof. This results in short proofs, and even allows to use the same argument to scale similar theorems that were proven using distinctly different tools. We demonstrate the versatility of our approach via examples from both revealed-preference theory and matching theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Scott Duke Kominers & Ran I. Shorrer, 2019. "To Infinity and Beyond: A General Framework for Scaling Economic Theories," Papers 1906.10333, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1906.10333
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    3. Bando, Keisuke & Kawasaki, Ryo, 2024. "Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 533-553.

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    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General

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