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Conventions and Coalitions in Repeated Games

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  • S. Nageeb Ali
  • Ce Liu

Abstract

We develop a theory of repeated interaction for coalitional behavior. We consider stage games where both individuals and coalitions may deviate. However, coalition members cannot commit to long-run behavior, and anticipate that today's actions influence tomorrow's behavior. We evaluate the degree to which history-dependence can deter coalitional deviations. If monitoring is perfect, every feasible and strictly individually rational payoff can be supported by history-dependent conventions. By contrast, if players can make secret side-payments to each other, every coalition achieves a coalitional minmax value, potentially reducing the set of supportable payoffs to the core of the stage game.

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  • S. Nageeb Ali & Ce Liu, 2019. "Conventions and Coalitions in Repeated Games," Papers 1906.00280, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1906.00280
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    Cited by:

    1. Ce Liu, 2020. "Stability in Repeated Matching Markets," Papers 2007.03794, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    2. Liu, Ce, 2023. "Stability in repeated matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
    3. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Scott Duke Kominers & Ran I. Shorrer, 2019. "To Infinity and Beyond: A General Framework for Scaling Economic Theories," Papers 1906.10333, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.

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